ABSTRACT
The Iraq-Iran crisis stands as one of the most intricate conflicts in the Middle East. This study employs the poliheuristic (PH) theory to scrutinize Iraq’s decision-making throughout the crisis. Utilizing Mintz’s (1993, 2004) PH model, the research aims to uncover the decision-making processes and outcomes during this period by scrutinizing the major policy dimensions and options accessible to Iraq’s leadership. In addition, it seeks an answer to the question of why Iraq, as a rising power in Middle Eastern politics, waged war against revolutionary Iran rather than sustaining diplomacy efforts initiated with Pehlevi Iran. The findings align with existing PH literature, revealing that Iraqi decision-makers followed a two-stage decision-making approach during the crisis. In the first stage, Iraqi leaders discarded options that could lead to losses, adhering to a non-compensatory rule. In the second stage, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s decisions were guided by expected utility maximization.