Obedience or Resistance: Muslim Conception of Time as a Reaction to the Authoritarian Turkish Modernization

İsmail Çağlar

Abstract: While considerations of Turkish modernization become more varied through studies with a social historical perspective, the limited number of alternative readings of the relationship between religion, state, and society is remarkable. Taking this as a departure point, this study investigates the possibility of analyzing the essence and existence of the different kind of opposition practiced by the ulema and sufis during the single-party period. In mainstream literature, the ulema and sufis' lack of reactive and communal agency against the modernizing reforms has been evaluated as pacifist or conformist. This study focuses on the relationship of these figures to tradition, their different understanding of time and reality, their struggle for dignity and social prestige, and claims that they ultimately form part of an agency and an opposition that is non-modern.

Keywords: Time Conceptions, Resistance, Obedience, Turkish Modernization, Modernizing Reforms, Ulema And Sufis.

Öz: Sosyal tarih yazımına daha çok vurgu yapan çalışmalarla birlikte Türk modernleşmesi okumaları çeşitlense de din-devlet-toplum ilişkileri göz önüne alındığında literatürdeki alternatif okumaların sayısının yetersizliği dikkat çekmektedir. Bu yetersizlikten hareket eden bu çalışma, tek parti döneminde taşrada ulema ve sufler tarafından gerçekleştirdiğin farklı bir muhalefet türünün varlığını ve bu muhalefet türünü analiz etmenin imkanını sorgulamaktadır. Ana akım literatürde, ulema ve suflerin modernleşmeci reformlara karşı reaktif ve toplumsal bir eylemlilik girmemeleri pasifizm veya boyun eğme olarak yorumlanmıştır. Bu çalışma bahsedilen figürlerin gelenekle olan ilişkisine, farklı zaman algalarına, farklı gerçeklik algılara ve verdikleri haysiyet ve prestij mücadelesine odaklanarak, bunların modern dışı bir eylemlilik ve muhalefete karşılık geldiğini iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Zaman Tasavvuru, Direniş, İtaat, Türk Modernleşmesi, Modernleştirme Reformları, Ulema ve Sufis.

Assist. Prof. Sabahattin Zaim University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.
Correspondence: smlcağlar@gmail.com. Address: İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 34303, Halkalı, Küçükçekmece, İstanbul, Turkey.

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Dominant paradigms in the historiography of Turkish modernization stand as formidable obstacles in understanding and analyzing the reactions to Kemalist modernization that have a top-to-down authoritarian character that aimed at modernizing and westernizing Turkish society by implementing legal reforms. Scholars have a tendency to write political histories of the process and this tendency casts a shadow over the social domain. A specific trend in the political historiography of Turkish modernization presents Turkish modernization as a conflict and break between the ‘traditional Ottoman’ and the ‘modern Republic’. According to these scholars, the ‘new’ and ‘young’ Turkish Republic completely changed the religious, traditional, and the Eastern image of Turkish society into the modern Western one. This understanding overemphasizes the importance and functions of modernizing judicial reforms such as the law on the compulsory wearing of hats, the recitation of the Turkish translation of adhan (the Muslim call for prayer), and the law on the unification of education that banned religious education (Tevhid-i-Tedrisat). It concludes that along with the Republic and thanks to these reforms a new Turkish society was established (Berkes, 1998; Lewis, 2002).

At a later date certain scholars focused on the continuity of the Ottoman and Turkish modernization processes, and thus challenged this conflict and break paradigm. Scholars like Erik Jan Zürcher (2004) and Şerif Mardin (2002) called their readers’ attention to the aforementioned continuity as well as the common cadres that led these processes. Challenging the conflict and break paradigm was an important contribution to the historiography of Turkish modernization; there was a long way ahead, however, for a thorough social history of Turkish modernization. Despite the fact that these figures used social history to understand Turkish modernization better, at the same time their works still had close ties to political historiography.

Fortunately, these first attempts to challenge political history and its binary oppositions continued with scholars of Turkish modernization focusing on the daily life and agency of ordinary people. A limited number of scholars from different academic disciplines focused on particular aspects of the social history of Turkish modernization. Among them Gavin Brocket, a social historian, conducted research on archival data and mapped the “collective action – specifically those claiming Islamic legitimation – that occurred between 1923 and 1938” (1998, p. 46). After listing and analyzing the cases of collective action in the Atatürk era, Brocket reached several conclusions on the effect of the legal modernizing arrangements on the daily life of the Anatolian people. He claimed that although certain legal arrangements such as the law regarding the usage of the Gregorian Calender and the observation of Sunday as a weekly holiday had secular effects, they did not affect many Turks in practical terms. Other laws such as the compulsory wearing of hats or the recitation of the Turkish translation of the Muslim call for prayer were superficially observed or almost completely ignored (Borckett, 1998, p. 60).

Besides Gavin Brocket, Hamit Bozarslan, and Umut Azak also studied collective action during the first years of the Turkish Republic. Bozarslan focused on a very controversial example of collective action in 1930, namely the Menemen Incident. Bozarslan revealed the social and economic causes behind the incident, which was generally regarded as a reactionary uprising of allegedly Naqshbandiya dervishes who aimed to restore Islamic rule in the secular republic. Bozarslan challenged the Kemalist historiography by claiming
that the incident was of a small scale and local support was very limited. The inhabitants of Menemen seemed for the most part uninfluenced by the claims of Dervish Mehmed, the leader of the six ‘reactionaries’. They neither supported the ‘reactionaries’ nor did they try to stop them, choosing instead to observe the affair. Bozarslan (2000) analyses their silence and concludes that it does not betray an acceptance of Dervish Mehmed and his companions’ claims but instead is an indication of social discomfort with the affects of authoritarian modernization, especially with the economic policies of the Kemalist regime that become more unbearable for the peasantry of the Aegean coast, where the town of Menemen was located, during and after the global economic crisis in 1929.

Umut Azak discusses the Menemen Incident from a different perspective. Like Bozaraslan, she underlines the socio-economic crisis and lack of any other means of opposition as the reasons behind the incident. In addition to this, Azak claims that the incident and its discourse served as a convenient medium for Kemalists to silence the political and social opposition: “the event and its aftermath should rather be seen as an episode when the authoritarian regime was challenged and resisted by the opposition, which was in turn slandered by the regime as enemies of the secular republic” (Azak, 2007, p. 158).

Ulema and Sufi Positions against Turkish Modernization

There are also other scholars whose work has revealed stories of resistance for the most part of a non-political nature; stories of social and/or cultural resistance; as well as individual accounts of resistance. Scholars, mostly with an Islamic theology background, place emphasis on the agency of the ulema and sufis. The works of Hülya Küçük, Mustafa Kara, and İsmail Kara are examples of such work. Hülya Küçük, following the declaration of the repressive character of Turkish modernization, listed opposition positions such as “those who supported the National Struggle but changed their attitudes soon after the reforms because they could not comply with them” (2007, p. 126); those who put up a “silent opposition” (2007, p. 128); “those who openly opposed the reforms/regime” (2007, p. 129); and “those who escaped abroad to continue their religious/political activities” (2007, p. 133).

Mustafa Kara also attempted to list the various positions adopted by the ulema and sufis and suggested that due to their full submission to God a certain number of them were never anxious about modernization; some others feared about a social collapse as a result of the collapse of religious life; and finally others were quite critical about the authoritarian modernization but remained silent because the repressive state apparatus severely punished and silenced any kind of opposition (M. Kara, 2001, p. 34). İsmail Kara also mentioned differing ulema and sufi positions against authoritarian modernization: those who adopted a wait-and-see strategy (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 186); those who conformed with the republican modernization (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 188-194); and those whose attitude towards modernizing reforms was complicated and contradictory (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 186). Furthermore, İsmail Kara and Mustafa Kara talk about one more specific position against authoritarian Turkish modernization. For them, there was also a number of ulema and sufi figures who did not oppose the authoritarian modernization out of an inability or fear of the fatal consequences of resistance, but simply because they were not interested in reforms or other ‘political’, ‘social’ and ‘economical’ developments, and were happy and content with their sufi life (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 188; M. Kara, 2001, p. 34).
This specific attitude or position underlined by İsmail Kara and Mustafa Kara deserves further attention for the promise it offers of a better understanding of the opposition of the ulema and sufis vis-a-vis the authoritarian modernization. Among many forms of resistance one is usually overlooked in the accounts of resistance and deserves further attention. The basic expression of this specific type of agency was a silent mental resistance. These people did not participate in the public life of the modernizing republic and took refuge in their faith. It was a spontaneous action, an action which was not taken against modernization either intentionally or unintentionally. It was not even an action, but a state in which these people had been living for a long time. Authoritarian modernization did not affect this state in any way.

Şerif Mardin also commented on the condition of this silent mental resistance. According to Mardin, modernization in Ottoman society replaced the traditional Islamic “imaginaire” with a Western-reformist “imaginaire”. Yet, the elite and the lower social layers of Ottoman society had different paces of transformation, the latter being considerably slower than the former. As a result, the traditional Islamic “imaginaire” “acquired increasingly ideological dimensions and became an integument, a “social cocoon,” within which common people sought protection from the changes introduced by Western-oriented reforms” (Mardin, 1991, p. 121).

The acquired theoretical and practical means of the ulema and sufis served as a medium for creating and maintaining a different habitus or social cocoon in Mardin’s conceptualization. Thanks to the comprehensive Islamic tradition –in sufism specifically this included life settings, culture and discourse- they had what they needed for a silent mental resistance in the form of isolation from modern public life. They established their own public and private alternative life, or, in fact, their traditional life, neither intentionally nor unintentionally, but spontaneously transformed into an alternative life. This alternative, however, was not a statement of opposition or a complete denial of modernity, but a totally different state than the modern one. Although modernity might have transformed their lives, it was not its raison d’être.

While analyzing the silent mental resistance of the ulema and sufis, one should not forget some basic constraints and limitations. First, it should be noted that these specific positions and actions were not dominant attitudes - they were only some among many different cases. On the other hand, these attitudes were not unique but were shared by many ulema and sufis. It should also not be forgotten that the agents of these specific opposition groups belonged to the former elites of their society and had been alienated and marginalized by the modernizing reforms. The ulema and sufis concerned were men –not women– with an elite profile who wrote books and poems; studied the highly sophisticated texts of the sufist tradition; engaged in fine arts as producers, creators, audience and respondents; had received formal higher education; and, in most cases, had a high economic status. Yet they were the elites of the ancient regime and their distinguishing characteristics meant nothing in the modern republic. Finally, it is not and cannot be known whether these people were following a well-designed intentional opposition or they continued to live their personal lives as they had before the authoritarian republican reforms. This means that it is the researcher’s gaze that proclaims their agency as opposition. With these constraints and limitations in mind we can continue, however, our quest for a better understanding of a specific type of agency during the authoritarian modernization.
Time Conception as an Opposition

The basic means for the ulema and sufis to form and maintain a silent mental resistance was a sui generis conception of time that was totally different from the modern one. It was not a “non” or “anti” modern conception of time but the traditional Muslim one that had its roots in centuries-long Islamic beliefs and practices. The different time conceptions of the various actors is a topic that is densely discussed in sociology and anthropology literature (Munn, 1992, pp. 93-123). Durkheim, for example, differentiates between personal time and social time and portrays, like Bergson, “inner durée as qualitatively differentiated but unsegmented, temporal movement” (Munn, 1992, p. 95). Yet different time conceptions, as Durkheim and Bergson have discussed, do not have strategic characteristics. Bourdieu is one of the rare figures who deals with time as a strategic notion. The actor, as discussed by Bourdieu, has the capability of “strategically manipulating time” (Munn, 1992, p. 107). However such a strategic manipulation of time does not have the direct oppositional characteristics as defined in this study. Examples of power-related conceptualizations of time can be seen in colonialism literature as for instance the implementation of a new calendar as a colonial method of governance (Munn, 1992, p. 23). Although time conceptualization in colonialism literature includes a power dimension, it is mostly about the dominant power instead of the oppositional one. Therefore the manner in which the oppositional function of Muslim conception of time is discussed in this study is different than the aforementioned examples.

One of the most important components of Muslim conception of time was a faith in destiny: everything is decided by the supreme will of God even before the first day of creation and will be experienced or occur when its time to transpire arrives. Their faith in destiny enabled the ulema and sufis to not give a face to face battle with modernization; they stopped for a while, questioned what was occurring (understood the problem), found a proper solution for the problem from the meaning and value system that they generated, and finally applied this solution. In order to understand the faith in destiny and the different conception of time among the ulema and sufis, and the type of agency this offered them, it is useful to draw attention to the term that often occurs in sufi texts: *ibn al-waqt*, the son of time. In tawwuf terms, the *ibn al-waqt* is the one who has cleansed himself of the worries of the past and present, and carries out the necessities of time while being inert and without volition in the face of divine manifestations (Ceyhan, 2012). Without entering into a reactionary opposition to modernist reforms, and acting according to the requirements of time, while preparing for the potentially better future rather than engaging in momentary responses were, according to this understanding, all strategic responses rather than expressions of passivity and inertness.

Their faith in destiny offered them a conception of time that freed them from the burden of giving immediate, vis-à-vis reactions to every modernizing action of the Kemalist republic. Kemalist historiography propagates the idea that the oppositional collective actions of the early republican period had a “religious reactionary” motivation that aimed to re-establish the “backward Sharia” rule in the country. Well-established scholars, on the other hand, agree on the idea that the real motivation behind the collective actions was the modernizing reforms rather than a stream of regime-opposing “religious reactions” and the collective actions rarely garnered support or participation from the local ulema and sufi figures.
(Azak, 2007, p. 156; Brockett, 1998, p. 54). If the ulema and sufis were to adopt a reactive and defensive position – surely they were oppositional but not reactive or defensive - against modernizing reforms that would consume a lot of their time and energy, and their remaining time, therefore, would not be enough for a long-term, institutional, well-qualified identity against the modern identity offered by the Kemalists. Such an oppositional position and conception of time was something totally contrary to the spontaneity and impetuosity of Kemalist modernizers and it constituted a further symbolic and cultural medium of opposition. As an inseparable part of their radical modernizing character, Kemalists were members of a “spontaneous generation” that meant their emphasis was always on “doing” instead of “thinking” (Adıvar, 1929, p. 29-30). This spontaneity was an advantage in the times of “doing” yet it turned out to be the opposite when a more broad and comprehensive task of transformation was necessary. Kemalists’ inability to fulfill the comprehensive task of transformation served as a point of departure for the opposition of the ulema and sufis. On the one hand, the ulema and sufis accepted or did not resist what Kemalists “did” in the name of modernization, and, on the other, they “thought”, analyzed, evaluated, and searched for their chances of survival on a different level within society after the Kemalist modernization. Although the difference between layers of “doing” and “thinking” is not merely a matter of time, Şerif Mardin’s manifestation of the difference as “Kemalist thought decades, whereas conservatives thought millennia” is worth mentioning (Mardin, 2002, p. 50).

The state of silent mental resistance becomes meaningful at the nexus of Kemalist spontaneity and conservative faith in destiny. Kemalists chanted the motto, “In the space of a small time we have accomplished many great deeds. […] We will succeed at greater deeds in less time”. The closure of the Dervish Lodges was, for instance, an example of the “many great deeds” of Kemalists. It is known that dervish lodges disappeared only in theory – they did not cease to exist after their closure. Some ulema and sufis think that it was not the new regime that closed the dervish lodges but rather their misuse of them and corruption from within. For example, Sheikh Şemseddin Efendi (1876-1936), who was the Sheik of Misri Dervish Lodge in Bursa, was one of those who thought that dervishes and Sheiks started to follow their own interests rather than the essence of sufism –the agreement between subject-believer and master- and this was the real reason for the closure of the dervish lodges (M. Kara, 2001, p. 26). What is more interesting is that Şemseddin Efendi concluded his ideas about the closure of dervish lodges by citing the verse from the Quran: “And ever is the command of Allah a destiny decreed” (Qur’an, 33:38). By doing so he was locating himself not in conformity with the “many great deeds” that were accomplished in the way of modernization but with the “destiny decreed”. Yet this was not a passive stance that explained away the closure of dervish lodges; it included a new positioning and in-depth deployment against the modernizing reforms as Şemseddin Efendi declared in one of his many poems: “Forbidden were the rituals and fundamentals of mine, Now spiritual remembrances and thoughts become this fate of mine.” By claiming that it was God’s decree that closed dervish lodges and not the Kemalist modernizers, Şemseddin Efendi annulled the “doing” of the latter and by adopting a new stance – manevi zikir u fikr u devran- made a leap forward.

The closure of dervish lodges was a clear example of “actions” that reflect the coercive capacity of the state. It is, of course, clear that the ulema and sufis did not have a “reaction” to the action in the physical domain where the action took place and, therefore, it can be claimed that this was an act of obedience. In order to further explain and clarify this point, the assistance of two binary concept sets can help us.
Apparent versus Hidden, Good versus Evil

The first set is that of the apparent and hidden, zahir/batin. According to this binary opposition every formation, including action and situation, has both an apparent and a hidden dimension. However, the opposition in the nexus of the apparent and hidden dimensions is not an ontological but rather an epistemological one. Furthermore, in the ontological sphere there is no duality and reality is monolithic. In the epistemological domain, on the other hand, there are different forms of perceived reality and in some cases what is perceived can be the exact opposite of what occurred. The apparent/hidden concept set is used in such cases in order to make sense of and/or reconcile the difference or distance between what is perceived and what has occurred. The second binary concept set is that of good versus evil, hayr/şer. Similar to the apparent/hidden opposition, good and evil are also not ontological. Whether a deed is good or evil is defined epistemologically according to the consequence of the deed; deeds that apparently have good consequences are defined as good and vice versa. Therefore any action that seems to be evil according to its consequences can be good in the hidden dimension. This means that there is not a distinction of good and evil in reality; things occur, they may have seemingly good or evil results, and seemingly good results may be evil in reality or vice versa.

With these concepts in mind, the reactions of the ulema and sufis to the authoritarian modernizations become more meaningful and traceable. There is a better way to understand the activity of the ulema and sufis than to attribute their “passivity” to their conformity with the reforms: by trying to explore their activities with the help of their conceptions of apparent vs. hidden and good vs. evil. Instead of giving an apparent reaction to the closure of the dervish lodges—just one example of repressive modernization—the ulema and sufis concentrated on the interior dimension of the closure and some concluded that, as in the case of Şemseddin Efendi, although apparently the authoritarian republican modernization closed the dervish lodges, the misuse and corruption of dervish lodges was the real reason in the hidden dimension. Furthermore, the closure was apparently an act of evil because the act had negative consequences yet it had the potential of being good, and it held the potential of producing good results in the future. Therefore, there was no need or urgency to have an apparent reaction to the closure. Instead, what should be done is to concentrate on the hidden reality, plan a new strategy, and wait until the time when the good consequences of apparently evil circumstances will arise.

The story of Sheikh Rahmi Baba (İ. Kara, 2009, pp. 181-182) offers a good example for understanding the role of the concepts of apparent vs. hidden reality, and good vs. evil. Rahmi Baba is a well-known sufi Sheikh who lived in Istanbul in the heydays of the authoritarian Kemalist modernization. The popular interpretation of Rahmi Baba’s alleged dream is a helpful example of the agency of the ulema and sufis in relation to the aforementioned binary concept sets. At the beginning of the 1930s, Rahmi Baba invited his fellow Sheikhs and khalifas to one of the dervish lodges of his sufi path in Anatolia. The agenda of the meeting was to recite “Qahriye” to Mustafa Kemal and his new regime. The agenda of the meeting was to recite “Qahriye” to Mustafa Kemal and his new regime. According to sufi belief, Qahriye is the recitation of the divine name “Ya Qahhar”, the Wrathful, and once the Qahriye is recited for a person, God will subdue the person if He accepts the recitation. An unexpected dream of Rahmi Baba, prior to the morning of the day when the Qahriye was to be recited, changed the plan. In the dream, Rahmi Baba saw Turkey located at the cen-
ter of a world map. The country was the color green, a sign of goodness. Yet thick, black, short walls surrounded it. The blackness of the walls was a symbol of evil whereas the shortness meant that evil would not live long. The Prophet Muhammed stood on Anatolia and he was redistributing the world’s lands: he gave Anatolia to Mustafa Kemal who was shamefaced and anxious and could not turn to face the Prophet Muhammed. Following the interpretation of the dream Rahmi Baba and his fellow Sheiks abandoned their plan of reciting Qahriye for Mustafa Kemal as it was the Prophet Muhammed himself who had given Anatolia to him.

The interpretation of Rahmi Baba’s story offers profound insights into the position of the ulema and sufi. Firstly, the highly conspicuous agency of Rahmi Baba and his fellows should be noted. Without knowing the story one might conclude that figures like Rahmi Baba, who expressed no concrete opposition to the authoritarian modernization, were content or had a passive stance towards the movement. Yet, Rahmi Baba and his fellows were ready to take oppositional action against the authoritarian modernization in the physical domain had their plans not been changed by Rahmi Baba’s dream. Secondly, their repositioning after the dream was also a sample of oppositional agency – yet this time it was not in the physical domain alongside the Kemalists’ modernizing reforms. This second phase of agency can be better understood with reference to the aforementioned concepts: their concept of time, concepts of apparent vs. hidden reality, and good vs. evil. In light of these concepts, the agency in Rahmi Baba and his fellow’s about-turn becomes clearer: it was revealed to them that the apparently evil modernizing reforms were inwardly good and their good would surface in due time.

One could argue that Rahmi Baba’s alleged dream and its interpretation are trivial and not eligible grounds and arguments for a scientific study. Yet, for the people in question the dream was sufficient evidence for planning their strategy and basing their agency; furthermore the dream’s influence far outlived the time and place it occurred. İsmail Kara mentions that the person who first told him about this popular dream was a supporter of Turkey’s then recently-elected, religiously conservative and politically liberal President Turgut Özal. When Turgut Özal was elected as president of modern Turkey, this person claimed that Rahmi Baba’s dream had supposedly come true with the presidency of a devout Muslim (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 182).

**Ulema and Sufi’s Experience of Disillusionment**

Another factor that can be helpful in understanding the oppositional agency of the ulema and sufis is their experience of disillusionment and their inability to make sense of authoritarian reforms. To understand this, one should take a closer look at the relationship between Kemalists and the ulema and sufis during the years of the National Struggle. According to Brockett, Kemalists made use of shared Islamic symbols for effectively mobilizing the local people of Anatolia for the National Struggle. In doing so, Kemalists were well aware of the potential of shared Islamic symbols and they feared they would be mobilized against the authoritarian modernization (Brockett, 1998, p. 52). As Brockett states, we can talk about a cooperation between Kemalists and the ulema and sufis during the years of the National Struggle. Yet the alliance broke off after their victory in the National Struggle when the Kemalists started applying their modernization policy. The allies of Kemalism in
the National Struggle turned out to be the potential enemies of authoritarian modernization after the National Struggle.

The memoirs of Ali Ulvi Kurucu, child of a local ulema family in Konya in the 1920s who migrated to Cairo for religious education banned in Turkey, is a good indicator of the ulema and sufis’ difficulty of making sense of what was going on in the name of national independence – an ideal they were committed to during the National Struggle. After the National Struggle, their ideal turned into a nightmare looming over their traditional lifestyle and beliefs. This is the reason Ali Ulvi Kurucu, for example, stated that they were unable to understand what was going on: “The point that my father and his fellows were complaining about and troubled by was the fact that those who inflicted upon us a great torment and cruelty were not enemies but the members of our own nation. […] they were asking each other: Are not we the nation who were victorious in the war [National Struggle] and achieved independence? Yes, then, why do these people fight against the Greeks? Because they thought that if Greeks occupy the country, they would convert us to Christianity, ban our adhan [Muslim call to prayer], change our alphabet, language and the way we dress” (Düzdağ, 2007, p. 66).

A similar confusion was the astonishment of Abdülbaki Dede who was forced to shave his beard and wear a western-style hat by those whom he fought with side by side in the National Struggle. He was a Sheikh in the Mawlawiya order and a commander in the Mükahidian-ı Mevleviye Alay, Troop of Mevlevi Fighters, which was formed during the years of the First World War. As a result of the authoritarian reforms he lost his position. His disillusionment and complaint is reflected in his poem (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 267):

A white-bearded elder was I, a cut to my beard and I became a young beauty
A sheikh of Mawlawiya was I, then I became a tavern keeper
Now neither a pure Muslim, nor a crimson infidel am I
I fell into the pit of sedition of the end of time
On my tongue the light of my faith, on my head the black hat
Like the twilight, apparent in the light of darkness was I

The fact that Abdülbaki Dede named “the end of time”, “ahir zaman”, as a “sedition”, “fitne” is a good indicator of his problematic relationship with the authoritarian modernization and with the period when the modernization occurred. It is clear and certain that he did not conform to the authoritarian modernization. Yet, writing a poem is not the most accustomed and appropriate way of resisting the activity of an authoritarian modernization. Abdülbaki Dede clearly stated, however, that he was not a man of modern times and, therefore, the way he mounted his resistance was also not modern. This is why, although he considered his belief in God and the hat he was forced to wear a contradiction between light and darkness, he did not resist the authoritarian modernization in the “modern” way that was expected.

1 Kesip rîş-i sefîdim pîr iken yosma civan oldum
Makam-ı mevlevîde şeyh idim pîr-i mugan oldum
Ne sâfi müsliman kaldım ne oldum kıpkızıl kâfir
Girfitâr-ı belâ-yı fitne-i âhir zeman oldum
Dilimde nûr-i imanîm kaldım ne oldum kûpîzîl kâfir
Misâl-i subh-i kâzip nûr u zulmette ayân oldum
In addition to the above, the entire story of authoritarian modernization was an issue of prestige and dignity for the ulema and sufis. The public influence and the prestigious position of the ulema and sufis were derogated by the authoritarian modernization. Respected sheiks and ulema became civil servants; at best they found a post, or in some cases the very high-credited ulema, such as Şemseddin Efendi, were compelled to take literacy courses to learn the Latin alphabet Turkey adopted in 1928 (İ. Kara, 2009, p. 285). There are also cases where the concern for prestige and dignity generated an oppositional agency of the type analyzed up to this this point. For example, when the compulsory law regarding the wearing of hats was issued in 1925, the mufti – the chief religious officer in a city- of Rize, a city on the Black Sea coast, and a member of the local ulema, without waiting for the official notification by the city’s governor, walked around Rize’s main street with hats. The reason why they were so eager to wear a hat without waiting for the official notification was not their conformity with the hat law –it was the idea that wearing a hat upon the command of the city’s governor meant accepting and recording the governor’s superiority (Kara, 2000, p. 178). The ulema’s move to wear hats can be interpreted as not resisting modernization reforms. However, following an agency that is not obvious at first and is built on a different level as this study has been attempting to establish, demonstrates that wearing hats as if it was of their own volition and not upon the orders of the city’s governor could be a form of resistance on the level of prestige and dignity.

Conclusion

Modernism’s capacity of transformation is a well-established fact. Turkey’s story about relations between state and religion also has their share of this transformative and encompassing capacity, and thus cannot be considered without reference to modernity. However, it is not possible to read every single part of the story about the relations between state and religion through modernism. The agency of the ulema and sufis in the periphery during the single-party period against the republic’s modernizing reforms is one of those areas where the reference to modernism does not suffice. We need to consider this area through references that are more local, daily, non-modern, and bottom-up.

The opposition demonstrated against the modernizing reforms implemented during the single-party regime has begun to be read anew through the aforementioned references. This study aimed to investigate a specific kind of opposition type and, in this manner, contribute to existing literature: the case of the ulema and sufis.

At first, the ulema and sufis seem to have not reacted or resisted the modernizing reforms. However, when this group’s agency is not restrained through a modern understanding of agency and opposition mentality, and is instead read through the world of meaning and tradition in which the group lived, a very different conception of agency and opposition emerges. This is based on an understanding of time completely at odds with the modern one; these actors, living outside the modern conception of time, escape the consuming burden of responding immediately and daily to modern reforms. Another important factor for the ulema and sufis’ oppositional agency is their belief in destiny which is intertwined with the notions of apparent vs. hidden and good vs. evil. Uniting these permeable meanings created an effect much like that of a different conception of time. Thus, the ulema and
sufis, who thought that the modernization reforms that seem evil in the apparent might be good in the hidden, formulated their agency according to their belief of waiting for good and evil to separate from each other. Alongside this, they saw opposition not just as something material in the physical dimension—they were also involved in oppositional agency at the level of prestige and dignity.

It is not possible to consider Turkish modernization or state-religion relations by relying exclusively on the basis presented in this study. This type of historiography is neither comprehensive nor explanatory. However, the examples of agencies and states of existence offered in this study can be understood through the exploration of similar alternative historiographies. For this reason, the proliferation of studies such as this will provide alternatives to the current readings of Turkish modernization and will expand the comprehension of the entire process. Furthermore another area of research this study poses concerns the legacy of Muslim conception of time as an opposition. Further insights can be gained by the study of the way this specific opposition affected the current identity formation, and the social and political relations of conservatives in Turkey.

References


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